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“INCREDIBLY DIFFICULT,  
TRAGICALLY NEEDED, AND  
ABSORBINGLY INTERESTING”: 
LESSONS FROM THE AFSC SCHOOL 
PROGRAM FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 
IN GAZA, 1949 TO 1950
Jo Kelcey
ABSTRACT
This article examines a school program operated by the American Friends Service 
Committee (AFSC) for Palestinian refugees in Gaza in 1949 and 1950. Drawing 
on historical records from organizations involved in the broader relief effort, it 
examines why the school program was set up and how it operated, and considers the 
lessons it offers for contemporary refugee education efforts. I argue that, while AFSC 
adopted an atypical approach to humanitarian relief that prioritized education from 
the outset of the crisis, the school program it developed was invariably constrained 
by the overarching humanitarian paradigm within which it operated. Funding 
for education was limited, which left the schools vulnerable to competing political 
objectives. This article underscores the importance of understanding the history of 
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East in order to understand its present, and to inform contemporary education 
efforts for other refugee populations. The article also highlights the need for a 
critical appraisal of attempts to align refugee education programs with the generally 
accepted principles of humanitarianism.
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INTRODUCTION
Established in late 1949, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) today provides education for more than half a 
million refugee students in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank. The 
U.S. government has been a major funder of UNRWA, consistently contributing 
one-third or more of its budget. However, in 2018, the Trump administration cut 
this funding, describing the agency as an “irredeemably flawed operation.”1 Since 
education accounts for over half of UNRWA’s program budget and two-thirds 
of its 21,000-member staff, these funding cuts effectively threaten the education 
of half a million Palestinian refugees in a region where 700,000 Syrian refugee 
children are already out of school.2 
UNRWA officials described the funding cuts as creating an “existential crisis” for 
the agency and expressed particular concern about the future sustainability of its 
education program.3 Much criticism of the U.S. decision to cut funding focused 
on the immediate humanitarian consequences and the security implications of 
a large number of children being out of school.4 This article considers UNRWA’s 
financial susceptibility from a historical perspective. Drawing from extensive 
archival research, I examine an early response to the need for education for 
Palestinian refugees who fled the Arab-Israeli war that began in 1948. In 1949 and 
1950, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), a Quaker organization 
that works to promote just and durable peace in the United States and abroad, 
initiated a school program for Palestinian refugees in Gaza.5 Since the AFSC 
program served as a prototype for the UNRWA education program, this history 
offers important insights into UNRWA’s current situation. It also sheds light on 
the complexities inherent in setting up education services in contexts of large-
scale displacement. 
1  Peter Beaumont and Oliver Holmes, “US Confirms End to UN Funding for Palestinian Refugees,” The 
Guardian, August 31, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/31/trump-to-cut-all-us-funding-
for-uns-main-palestinian-refugee-programme.
2  UNRWA, “What We Do,” https://www.unrwa.org/what-we-do/education; Ana V. Ibáñez Prieto, “Four 
Million Refugee Children Out of School Worldwide, Over 70,000 in Jordan,” The Jordan Times, August 30, 
2018, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/four-million-refugee-children-out-school-worldwide-over-
70000-jordan.
3  UNRWA, “UNRWA Statement on Implications of Funding Shortfall on Emergency Services in the 
OPT,” July 26, 2018, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/unrwa-statement-on-implications-of-funding-
shortfall-on-emergency-services-in-the-opt/. 
4  Colum Lynch, “U.S. to End All Funding to U.N. Agency That Aids Palestinian Refugees,” Foreign 
Policy, August 26, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/28/middle-east-palestinian-israel-pompeo-trump-
kushner-u-s-to-end-all-funding-to-u-n-agency-that-aids-palestinian-refugees/.
5  AFSC, “About Us,” July 10, 2019, https://www.afsc.org/about-us.
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This article asks and answers two main questions: Why did AFSC establish a school 
program for Palestinians in Gaza? How did the AFSC school program operate? 
I argue that AFSC supported education in Gaza in keeping with its mission to 
promote peace and justice. However, the United Nations’ (UN) overarching view 
of humanitarian relief as a temporary and apolitical intervention limited funding 
for the school program, resulted in heavy dependence on host states’ education 
structures, and left the schools susceptible to political manipulation. I draw two 
important lessons from this history. First is the need to understand UNRWA’s 
contemporary situation in light of its past, in particular the conditions that shaped 
its establishment. Second is the importance of learning from the Palestinian 
case when designing and implementing education responses to contemporary 
large-scale displacement crises. I argue that the decisions made in the months 
following the Palestinian refugee crisis of 1948 have had an enduring impact on 
UNRWA’s education program. This history points in particular to the need to 
reflect critically on the implications of initiating education programs for refugees 
under conditions imposed by humanitarianism, which, by claiming to be neutral 
and impartial, obscures the highly political and politicized role of education.6
The article is organized as follows. In the next section I provide background on 
the Palestinian case and discuss its wider significance, followed by a description 
of my methods and analytical approach. I then examine the establishment and 
development of the AFSC school program in light of the two most persistent 
claims of humanitarian aid: that it is temporary and apolitical. I conclude by 
reflecting on the relevance of this history for understanding UNRWA’s current 
situation and the challenges facing refugee education initiatives more broadly. 
THE RELEVANCE OF THE PALESTINIAN CASE 
Between 1947 and 1949, approximately 800,000 Palestinians were forced to leave 
Palestine due to the raging conflict. Most sought asylum in neighboring countries 
and territories.7 Humanitarian support initially was provided by families, religious 
6  International Committee of the Red Cross, “The Fundamental Principles of the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement,” October 31, 1986, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/fundamental-
principles-red-cross-and-red-crescent. For a more detailed discussion of these claims and their centrality to 
humanitarian action, see Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2011). For a discussion of the short-term horizons of humanitarianism, see Cathrine 
Brun, “There Is No Future in Humanitarianism: Emergency, Temporality and Protracted Displacement,” 
History and Anthropology 27, no. 4 (2016): 393-410, https://doi.org/10.1080/02757206.2016.1207637.
7  Ilan Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).
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organizations, and host governments. In July 1948, these efforts were supplemented 
by the United Nations Disaster Relief Programme (UNDRP), which delivered 
basic supplies to the refugees. In November 1948, UNDRP was replaced by the 
United Nations Relief for Palestinian Refugees (UNRPR), which contracted three 
organizations to administer aid on its behalf: AFSC in Gaza, the League of Red 
Cross Societies in Lebanon and Syria, and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross in Jordan and the West Bank. These organizations were contracted to 
deliver food, shelter, and basic medical aid for the refugees for an eight-month 
period, but they remained for 18 months. Their programs were transferred to 
UNRWA when it began operations in May 1950. Among the projects handed 
over was a burgeoning network of schools. 
Although studies have highlighted the key role the refugees themselves played 
in setting up these schools, less attention has been paid to how international aid 
actors shaped the education efforts.8 A better understanding of the dynamics and 
practices of aid provision during the formative period of 1948-1950 is important 
to understanding what came after. While the politics of aid have been examined 
in conflict-affected contexts, less attention has been paid to the ways aid shapes 
education for refugees whose displacement and exile are protracted and for whom 
education is often a priority.9 Aid is never apolitical, not least aid to education, and 
the history of AFSC’s work in Gaza provides a valuable lens through which to view 
this topic.10 Refugees have outnumbered locals in Gaza since 1948, accounting 
for around 70 percent of the territory’s population. Most refugees in Gaza are 
dependent on the aid and services UNRWA provides.11 Although schools for 
Palestinian refugees were established across UNRPR’s area of operation, the Gaza 
program was the largest. When UNRWA started work on May 1, 1950, it inherited 
33,000 refugee students studying in 62 schools in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the 
West Bank, and Gaza; more than half were in Gaza.12 
8  Anne E. Irfan, “Educating Palestinian Refugees: The Origins of UNRWA’s Unique Schooling System,” 
Journal of Refugee Studies fez051 (2019): 1-23, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fez051.
9  Sarah Dryden-Peterson, “Refugee Education: Education for an Unknowable Future,” Curriculum Inquiry 
47, no. 1 (2017): 14-24, https://doi.org/10.1080/03626784.2016.1255935.
10  Dana Burde, Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2014). 
11  UNRWA, “Where We Work,” https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/gaza-strip.
12  UNESCO, “Report on Educational Assistance to the Refugee Children in the Middle East, 1 January 
1949 to 31 July 1950,” UNESDOC, 5, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000128047_eng. Of the 33,000 
students UNRWA inherited across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan (including the West Bank), approximately 
18,000 students were located in 22 schools in Gaza. AFSC, “Report on Educational Assistance to the Refugee 
Children in the Middle East, 1 January 1949 to 31 July 1950,” 5.
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In taking over AFSC’s work in Gaza, UNRWA didn’t just inherit schools, it 
inherited an education program with specific policies. Records suggest that the 
AFSC program was the most systematized of the education efforts developed 
for those in exile.13 Moreover, the role AFSC played in ensuring that the refugee 
schools continued under UN administration and the fact that UNRWA hired 
former AFSC volunteers to run the schools are indicative of the influence this 
early education model had on the model developed by UNRWA. 
UNRWA: Exceptional or Indicative?
Initially conceived as a temporary organization, UNRWA has now been in 
operation for seven decades. It currently serves five million “Palestine refugees” 
to whom it is mandated to provide relief, human development, and protection 
services.14 Education is UNRWA’s largest activity, accounting for more than half of 
the agency’s core operational budget and around 70 percent of its staff.15 The field 
of refugee studies has tended to treat the Palestinian case as an exception, which 
reflects the partial exclusion of Palestinians from the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and the different ways UNRWA and the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) operate.16 The Palestinian case is also distinguished by 
its longevity, its high proportion of refugees relative to the overall Palestinian 
population (refugees account for three-quarters of the Palestinian population 
worldwide), and the entrenched political impediments to finding a just and 
durable solution to the refugees’ situation.17 These differences have been reified 
13  AFSC, report on education activities, November 1949, Folder 60, Foreign Service Section, Palestine 
1949, “Refugee Projects: Projects School Program” (Philadelphia: AFSC). “It is a pleasure to note that the 
refugee schools in the Southern Palestine area are an integral part of the AFSC program with refugees, 
operating with regular hours, administration and curriculum. Attendance of both teachers and students is 
regular.”
14  Palestine refugees are “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 
June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.” 
UNRWA, “Palestine Refugees,” https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees. Although this is an administrative 
definition endorsed by the UN General Assembly, Palestine refugees are also recognized as refugees as per 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. See Francesca Albanese, “Current Issues in Depth: UNRWA and Palestine 
Refugee Rights. New Assaults, New Challenges” (Washington, DC, Institute for Palestine Studies, 2018). 
15  UNRWA, “What We Do: Education,” https://www.unrwa.org/what-we-do/education. 
16  UNHCR statute states that UNHCR services should not extend to refugees who receive protection or 
assistance from other UN agencies. Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention notes, however, that whenever 
the assistance and protection provided to the refugees served by other agencies ceases they should then come 
under UNHCR’s mandate. For an in-depth discussion of this, see Albanese, “Current Issues in Depth.”
17  These impediments include Israel’s raison d’être as a Jewish and Zionist state, the lack of Palestinian 
sovereignty over historic Palestine, the fact that a large number of refugees within UNRWA’s areas of operation 
continue to demand repatriation, and the associated denial of citizenship rights to the refugees by several 
host states. Michael Dumper, “Palestinian Refugees,” in Protracted Refugee Situations, Political, Human 
Rights and Security Implications, ed. Gil Loescher, James Milner, Edward Newman, and Gary G. Troeller 
(New York: United Nations University Press, 2008), 189-213.
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in policy discourse, which creates a tendency to avoid comparisons between the 
Palestinian case and other refugee contexts, or even to highlight shared aspects.18 
Certainly, the Palestinian case evolved in a distinct way. In July 1948, the UN 
established UNDRP, which was replaced by UNRPR in November of that year. Just 
one month later, in December 1948, the United Nations Conciliation Commission 
for Palestine (UNCCP) was created to negotiate a political solution to the Israel-
Palestine conflict. When UNRWA was established in late 1949, it took over 
UNRPR’s relief portfolio while its operational and supposedly apolitical mandate 
was intended to complement, rather than reproduce, the efforts of UNCCP. 
Although UNCCP still exists in name, its operations stopped in the early 1950s, 
leaving UNRWA as the only UN agency actively working with Palestinian refugees 
in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank. Thus, by the time the 1951 
Refugee Convention was drafted, a distinct two-part regime, consisting of UNCCP 
and UNRWA, was already in place for the Palestinian refugees.
The different purposes assigned to UNRWA and UNHCR and their separate 
historical trajectories have resulted in marked differences in how the two agencies 
operate. These differences are especially apparent in education. Fifty-four percent 
of UNRWA’s program budget is spent on education, which is used to operate 
schools and hire and train thousands of staff members, the overwhelming 
majority of whom are Palestine refugees.19 In the 1960s, the agency achieved 
nearly full enrollment in basic education for Palestine refugees. UNHCR, in 
contrast, does not operate schools; it coordinates efforts between various service 
providers (public, private, and NGO) to provide education for the refugees under 
its mandate. Education accounted for 9 percent of UNHCR’s global programs 
budget in 2017, and only 50 percent of the refugees under UNHCR’s mandate 
currently have access to primary education.20 
While UNRWA fares comparatively well in terms of providing refugees with 
access to education, the role and purpose of its education program are contested. 
Scholars have questioned whether the agency can meet the needs and aspirations 
of stateless Palestinians for whom national liberation and the preservation of 
18  Michael Kagan, “The (Relative) Decline of Palestinian Exceptionalism and Its Consequences for Refugee 
Studies in the Middle East,” Journal of Refugee Studies 22, no. 4 (2009): 417-38, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/
fep023.
19  UNRWA, “How We Spend Funds,” https://www.unrwa.org/how-you-can-help/how-we-spend-funds.
20  UNHCR, “Biennial Programme Budget 2018-2019 of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees,” August 31, 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/excom/excomrep/59c276a27/biennial-
programme-budget-2018-2019-office-united-nations-high-commissioner.html; UNHCR, Turn the Tide: 
Refugee Education in Crisis (Geneva: UNHCR, 2018).
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cultural identity are paramount.21 Moreover, UNRWA’s use of host state curricula 
has been criticized for suppressing Palestinians’ historical narrative and violating 
their right to a culturally relevant education.22 Another critique of the agency 
is that it breeds dependency on aid and promotes anti-Israel bias, including 
through its schools.23 This last critique was cited by the U.S. government in 2018 
when it withdrew its funding. In announcing this decision, the state department 
declared that it was “no longer willing to shoulder the disproportionate burden 
of UNRWA’s costs.” It further objected to UNRWA’s “business model and fiscal 
practices,” which, it argued, resulted in an “endlessly and exponentially expanding 
community of entitled beneficiaries.”24 
The particulars of the Palestinian case notwithstanding, the protracted nature 
of contemporary displacement and the many debates about UNRWA’s education 
program highlight the common challenge facing refugee education programs;25 
namely, the tensions that arise when education—which is conventionally 
understood as a long-term activity that helps foster sociocultural belonging, 
political community, and economic development—occurs within the framework 
of humanitarianism, which posits temporary and apolitical interventions.26 The 
history of the AFSC program sheds light on these contradictions and offers 
valuable insights into the subsequent development of UNRWA, and the inherent 
challenges of initiating education efforts in contexts of large-scale displacement. 
21  Ibrahim Abu Lughod, “Educating a Community in Exile: The Palestinian Experience,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 2, no. 3 (1973): 94-111, https://doi.org/10.2307/2535750.
22  Rosemary Sayigh, “Where Are the History Books for Palestinian Children?” Journal of Holy Land and 
Palestine Studies 16, no. 2 (2017): 145-75, https://doi.org/10.3366/hlps.2017.0163.
23  Adi Schwartz and Einat Wilf, “How UNRWA Prevents Gaza from Thriving,” Ha’aretz, June 6, 2018, 
https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium.MAGAZINE-how-unrwa-prevents-gaza-
from-thriving-1.6155143.
24  U.S. Department of State, “On U.S. Assistance to UNRWA,” August 31, 2018, https://www.state.gov/
on-u-s-assistance-to-unrwa/.
25  A protracted refugee situation is 25,000 refugees or more who have been in exile for a minimum of 
five years. This figure excludes Palestine refugees in UNRWA’s areas of operations. In 2018, 78 percent of 
refugee situations were protracted accounting for 15.9 million refugees. UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced 
Displacement in 2018. (Geneva: UNHCR, 2019). 
26  See, for example, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); Emile Durkheim, Education and Sociology, trans. Sherwood D. Fox 
(New York: The Free Press, 1956); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1983).
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DATA AND METHODS
History is a contested social process, as different groups and individuals have 
uneven access to the means for producing and narrating history.27 As such, 
historical approaches are especially relevant in uncovering the politics and 
power dynamics of aid interventions. However, historical research on responses 
to forced displacement is relatively rare. Several factors explain this. Bakewell 
argues that the trend toward policy-relevant research can render certain groups 
of refugees invisible to scholars.28 A preoccupation with the relevance of policy 
may also favor research on newly emerging crises, rather than on cases of 
longstanding displacement. Moreover, humanitarianism, which continues to 
dominate responses to refugee situations, is rooted in the idea that the provision 
of aid is apolitical, which in turn implies a significant degree of ahistoricism. 
Finally, displacement and conflict often are not conducive to record-keeping 
or to preserving historical sources, which limits the possibility of conducting 
historical research.29 Fortunately, rich historical sources were found to support 
this examination of the Palestinian case.
Historical Records
This study is part of a larger research project for which I consulted seven archives 
and several online collections between 2016 and 2018. Three archives were 
especially relevant in reconstructing the history of the AFSC school program: 
the AFSC archive in Philadelphia, the UNESCO archive in Paris, and the United 
Nations Archives and Records and Management Section (UNARMS) archive in 
New York City.
AFSC meticulously documented its work in Gaza; six boxes of files cover the 
period from 1948 to 1950. Typical documents include program reports sent from 
Gaza to colleagues in Philadelphia, correspondence between the AFSC team and 
the UNRPR staff, internal memos, and meeting minutes. The AFSC records were 
especially valuable in understanding this period because of the leading role AFSC 
played and because of the self-reflective nature of Quakerism, which lends itself 
27  Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1995), xix.
28 Oliver Bakewell, “Research beyond the Categories: The Importance of Policy Irrelevant Research into 
Forced Migration,” Journal of Refugee Studies 21, no. 4 (2008): 432-35, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fen042.
29 Jérôme Elie, “Histories of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies,” in The Oxford Handbook of Refugee 
and Forced Migration Studies, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 23-35.
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to rich and critical political commentary.30 I reviewed all the AFSC files related 
to its Gaza program during this period.
UNESCO and UNARMS offer finding aids that help researchers identify and locate 
files that are relevant for their studies. The UNESCO archive was an important 
source of information. UNESCO has been involved in providing education 
for Palestine refugees since November 1948, when the Lebanese government 
requested support during the agency’s Third Annual Conference, held in Beirut. 
Between 1948 and 1950, UNESCO provided funding and technical advice to the 
agencies contracted by UNRPR and offered fellowships for Palestinian teachers 
to study abroad. When UNRWA was established, the UN secretary general asked 
UNESCO to continue providing technical support to the agency on education 
matters. However, few studies have considered the role UNESCO played in shaping 
UNRWA’s education program or have drawn from UNESCO’s rich archives. 
The UNARMS records in New York offer insights into the administrative and 
logistical dimensions of UNRPR’s work. I took detailed notes while in the archives 
and scanned the most relevant documents for further analysis. I supplemented 
these records with the memoirs of aid workers, oral histories of former AFSC 
volunteers, and other relevant literature.
Interpretative Approach
To understand the contested social processes that shaped the establishment and 
operation of the AFSC school program and precipitated its transition to UN 
administration, I sought to identify the motivations and influences that informed 
the establishment and operation of the program. Since the AFSC program was 
initiated first and foremost as a humanitarian intervention, I interrogated these 
motivations and influences in light of two aspects of the humanitarian paradigm: 
that the nature of emergencies is temporary, and that humanitarian interventions 
are apolitical. I thus sought to understand how the discursive environment of 
humanitarian aid shaped the provision of education for Palestinian refugees.
By analyzing the records of different organizations and a wide range of document 
types, I sought to balance organizational perspectives and mitigate gaps in the 
historical narrative. However, limitations must be acknowledged. Archival records 
are necessarily incomplete, and the criteria for preserving documents are not 
30  Julie Peteet, “The AFSC Refugee Archives on Palestine: 1948-1950,” in Reinterpreting the Historical 
Record: The Uses of Palestinian Refugee Archives for Social Science Research and Policy Analysis, ed. Salim 
Tamari and Elia Zureik (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001), 109-28. See also, Ilana 
Feldman, “The Quaker Way: Ethical Labor and Humanitarian Relief,” American Ethnologist 34, no. 4 (2007): 
689-705, https://doi.org/10.1525/ae.2007.34.4.689.
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always clear. Archives also privilege particular perspectives, in this case those of 
foreign aid workers and Western government officials. Thus, the history presented 
here by no means comprehensively reflects the refugee experience. Rather, it sheds 
light on why and how the AFSC school program was established and provides 
insight into the limitations that shape education programs for refugees. 
SETTING UP THE SCHOOLS
By 1948, AFSC had amassed extensive experience working in the United States 
and abroad. Grounded in the Quaker approach to conflict resolution, the AFSC’s 
work differs from traditional models of humanitarianism, in that it focuses not 
only on saving lives but also on creating conditions for peace through education 
and community development.31 During the 1930s, AFSC won the admiration 
of Eleanor Roosevelt, and when the Arab-Israeli war broke out in 1948, she 
recommended to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie that AFSC be involved in 
relief efforts for Palestinian refugees. Lie considered AFSC a good fit for the UN 
relief efforts: it had the requisite experience, had worked with Jewish refugees in 
Europe, and had been engaged in early efforts to secure a ceasefire in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Conscious that the UN was a new organization that needed to 
prove itself, Lie was also keen not to subcontract the entire aid effort to the 
Red Cross.32 
However, AFSC had reservations about working with the UN. It was largely a 
volunteer-based organization, and senior staff members were concerned about 
their ability to manage such a big operation. They also worried that, by working 
through the UN, AFSC would “have to face some compromises away from their 
traditional ways of working.”33 To address these concerns, AFSC officials agreed to 
work with the UN only if certain operational criteria, known as the 19 points, were 
met. These criteria established the scale and scope of the planned relief efforts, 
articulated AFSC’s operational autonomy, and underscored AFSC’s expectation 
that its relief efforts would be accompanied by concerted political efforts by the 
UN to address the refugees’ predicament.34 To the surprise of AFSC officials, 
the UN agreed to these terms, and a contract between AFSC and UNRPR was 
31  Nancy Gallagher, Quakers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Dilemmas of NGO Humanitarian 
Activism (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2007), 7-8.
32  Gallagher, Quakers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 51.
33  AFSC, Minutes of the Foreign Service Executive Committee meeting, November 17, 1948, Folder 174, 
Foreign Service Section, Palestine (Philadelphia: AFSC). 
34  Minutes of the Foreign Service Executive Committee meeting, November 17, 1948.
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signed in November 1948. The project was to last eight months, which UN officials 
assumed would be enough time to get a political resolution in place.
AFSC was contracted to provide food, shelter, and basic medical care for the 
refugees—a huge task. More than 200,000 people had sought refuge in Gaza, far 
outnumbering the local population of 80,000. Moreover, fighting between the 
Egyptians and Israelis continued, causing fear among the refugees and tensions 
between AFSC and the Egyptian army. In journal entries from January 1949, 
Clarence Pickett, then CEO of AFSC, described the difficult conditions the agency 
faced in its aid efforts:
I watched them bury a man, a baby born, hundreds of 
malnourished children, a local farmer angry because the 
refugees are burning up his trees and sands would soon shift 
again. Also we saw the problem of the surrender of authority 
by the army and our assuming it. This project is incredibly 
difficult. Tragically needed, and absorbingly interesting.35 
By March 1949, however, AFSC was not only providing food, shelter, and basic 
medical care to the refugees; it also had launched a school program. 
Schools for the refugees preceded AFSC’s arrival in Gaza. An AFSC report from 
February 1949 describes, for example, how refugee teachers in the Al Maghazy 
camp in central Gaza had established three classes in an old kitchen. Students 
lacked desks and there were only a few copy books to go around. The instruction 
was repetition-based, and teachers illustrated lessons by drawing on the stone 
wall with rocks.36 Refugees had also sought placement in local public schools, 
but demand far exceeded supply. The Egyptian authorities, who had assumed 
effective control of Gaza during the Arab-Israeli war, were overwhelmed, and 
the UNRPR plans did not include provisions for education. 
External support for education was initiated in January 1949, when Pickett visited 
Gaza and Egypt to set up the relief program. Pickett had an expansive vision 
that included all 70,000 school-age children in Gaza having access to education.37 
Egyptian officials were receptive to the idea but stressed that these schools should 
35  AFSC, Journal entry of Clarence Pickett, undated, Folder 133, Foreign Service Section, Palestine, 1949 
Refugee Projects: Reports, Pickett trip (Philadelphia: AFSC), 4-5.
36  AFSC, Background material on Maghazy, February 16, 1949, Folder 116, Foreign Service Section, 
Letters to the United Nations (Philadelphia: AFSC).
37  AFSC, Report on Educational Activities, August 1, 1949. Folder 60, Foreign Service Section, Palestine, 
1949, Refugee Projects (Philadelphia: AFSC), 13.
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be kept separate from their country’s education system. Although the records do 
not give a clear reason for this, there was general resistance among Arab states 
to integrating the refugees into the public sector through the burgeoning aid 
projects, lest this commit them to the long-term care of the refugees and prejudice 
the resolution of their situation.38 The Egyptians also asked AFSC to work closely 
with the Palestinian education authorities in Gaza to develop a hybrid program 
that supported both Gazans and the refugees. 
The AFSC school program was officially launched in March 1949. It sought to 
integrate refugee children into public schools to the greatest extent possible; they 
did this by increasing the number of students per class and using two school 
shifts. Schools that had been established by the refugees and local Gazans were 
brought under the auspices of the AFSC school program and additional schools 
were created, all staffed by volunteers. The Palestinian inspector of education 
for Gaza supervised and kept records on all of these schools, thus providing a 
measure of standardization between the refugee and local school systems. Despite 
resistance from the Egyptian administration, AFSC also insisted that the schools 
accommodate girls and boys. 
The school program grew quickly; by June 1949, 16,000 refugees were studying in 
dedicated refugee schools where they were taught by 400 teachers. Five thousand 
of these students were girls.39 A further 6,000 refugees were studying in public 
schools. However, UNRPR’s vision of humanitarian relief was of a short-term 
intervention that addressed the biological necessities of life, and it did not allow its 
funds to be used for the schools, despite the refugees’ clear demand for education. 
Financially unable to expand their program, the AFSC team spent much of late 
1949 and early 1950 consolidating the existing schools. They sought donations of 
paper, books, maps, and pens from UN agencies, diplomatic missions, and religious 
and charitable societies in Egypt and further afield. In carpentry workshops run 
by AFSC, refugees made classroom benches and cabinets. Finally, the decision 
was made to direct surplus tents and food rations to the school program to create 
a basic classroom infrastructure and a feeding program. 
As time wore on, AFSC grew concerned about the future of the school program. 
The UNRPR mandate was set to expire in April 1950, but political negotiations led 
by UNCCP regarding the refugees’ return had stalled. By late 1949, it was clear 
38  Letter from Sir Raphael Cilento, Director of the Division of Social Activities to Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary 
General of the United Nations, September 26, 1949, Folder, S-0369-0034-002 (New York: UNARMS). 
39  AFSC, Letter from Howard Wriggins to Colin Bell, re. Educational Programme, June 2, 1949, Folder 
60, Foreign Service Section, Palestine, 1949, Refugee Projects: Projects School Program (Philadelphia: AFSC).
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that UNRPR would be replaced by a new initiative. Plans for this follow-up were 
heavily influenced by the U.S. government, which dispatched an economic survey 
mission (ESM) to the region. The ESM recommended replicating large-scale public 
works projects of the type implemented in the United States during and after the 
Great Depression. U.S. officials reasoned that schemes of this type would create 
jobs for the refugees and promote the economic development of the host states. 
There also was an ulterior motive; Elmore Jackson, director of the Quaker UN 
office, wrote to Pickett, “Although the [ESM] report itself and no one here says 
that this is a first step towards the ‘resettlement’ of the refugees in Lebanon, Syria 
and Trans-Jordan, everyone tacitly admits that this is the case.”40 U.S. officials 
assumed that economic development and jobs would distract the refugees and host 
states from their resistance to resettlement, thus bypassing the political stalemate 
and any corresponding obligation to facilitate large-scale repatriation for the 
refugees. The ESM did recognize the need for ongoing humanitarian assistance, 
but it stated that these efforts should be on a smaller scale than before and only 
last until December 1950. By this time, U.S. officials reasoned, the refugees would 
be self-sufficient and the need for relief obviated.41 The ESM’s recommendations 
formed the basis for UN General Assembly Resolution 302(IV), which spelled 
out plans for the creation of a UN agency to carry this vision forward.42 This 
agency was UNRWA. Interestingly, these plans made no reference to the primary 
education that would come to characterize UNRWA’s programming.
The AFSC was committed to ensuring that the schools continued. However, staff 
members found themselves unacceptably constrained by the UN’s humanitarian 
vision and structures, which prevented them from pursuing programming that 
promoted peace and justice.43 Staff members were especially uncomfortable with 
the idea of providing long-term relief in the absence of meaningful political 
engagement around the refugees’ future.44 AFSC briefly considered transferring 
the schools to Egyptian authorities, which made sense practically, as operation 
of the schools already required the Egyptians’ agreement. By early 1950, it was 
AFSC policy to use the Egyptian curriculum where possible.45 However, AFSC 
40  AFSC, Memo from Elmore Jackson to Clarence Pickett, November 29, 1949, Folder 123, Foreign 
Service Section, Palestine, 1949, Refugee Projects: Reports, United Nations, Economic Survey Mission (Clapp 
Mission) (Philadelphia: AFSC).
41  Benjamin N. Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation: UN Aid to Palestinians (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1995).
42  UN General Assembly, 1949, December 8, “Resolution 302(IV)—Assistance to Palestine Refugees.” 
A/RES/302(IV). 
43  Feldman, “The Quaker Way.”
44  Letter from Clarence Pickett to Trygve Lie, May 5, 1949, File S-0369-0034-001 (New York: UNARMS).
45  Operational report of the AFSC, February 1950, Folder 132, Foreign Service, Projects, school program 
1950 (Philadelphia: AFSC).
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was concerned that the Egyptian authorities would make the schools selective and 
charge fees, and that they would be used to promote government propaganda.46 
Consequently, the team focused on persuading the UN to assume administration 
of the schools. Between January and April 1950, they approached the UN secretary 
general, the U.S. State Department, UNESCO, the British foreign office, and even 
U.S. oil companies in the hope that one of these could financially or politically 
secure the future of the schools, but none would commit to such support.47 In 
the meantime, AFSC funded the school program by selling empty containers 
that had been used to deliver relief supplies.48 
In March 1950, UN officials expressed interest in continuing the schools under 
UN administration.49 However, in early April, just weeks before UNRPR was set 
to dissolve, a representative from the U.S. State Department informed AFSC that 
it was unlikely UNRWA would receive the full funding it was promised, leaving 
the future of the schools unclear.50 Finally, on April 21, 1950, just nine days before 
UNRWA officially began operations, AFSC received confirmation that the schools 
could continue, financed by UNRWA’s relief budget.51 
With these historical contours in mind, the next section examines the establishment 
of the AFSC school program in light of the two central impulses of conventional 
humanitarianism: its assumed temporary and apolitical character.
The “Emergency Imaginary”52
Definitions of humanitarianism are central to the provision of education in 
conflict-affected contexts. Burde distinguishes between maximalist and minimalist 
46  Memo from Corrine Hardesty to Bronson Clark on the future of the schools, March 1, 1950, File 132, 
Foreign Service Projects, School Program 1950 (Philadelphia: AFSC).
47  Although records show that the AFSC — by and large—supported repatriation, it also issued a memo 
in January 1949 stating that its vocational and training projects in no way prejudiced the chances of refugee 
resettlement. Clarence Pickett, Memorandum regarding work possibilities in the Gaza area, January 26, 1950, 
File 132, Foreign Service Projects, School Program 1950 (Philadelphia: AFSC).
48  Operational report of the AFSC, March 1950, Folder 151, Foreign Service Reports to UNRPR, OPS 
(Philadelphia: AFSC).
49  AFSC operational report, March 1950.
50  Letter from Bronson Clarke to Colin Bell, April 18, 1950, Folder 244, Administration Transition from 
AFSC to United Nations (Philadelphia: AFSC). See also, Confidential memo from James Keen on the ending 
of direct international responsibility for Palestine refugees, May 13, 1950, File S-0369-034-04 (New York: 
UNARMS).
51  Correspondence from T. Barton Akeley to Bronson Clarke, April 21, 1950, File 132, Foreign Service 
Projects, School Program, 1950 (Philadelphia: AFSC).
52  Craig Calhoun, The Emergency Imaginary: Humanitarianism, States, and the Limits of Cosmopolitanism. In 
University Professorship Inaugural Lecture, November 15, 2006 (unpublished).
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approaches to humanitarianism.53 Minimalists adhere to definitions that are 
consistent with the “emergency imaginary”—that is, the idea that emergencies are 
sudden, temporary problems that suspend populations in a “state of exception.”54 
This in turn shapes the organization of humanitarian interventions and the type 
of aid provided. Minimalist aid tends to focus on biological needs for survival 
and assumes that, once a crisis is over, longer-term activities like education can 
resume. Maximalists, on the other hand, recognize that crises are often protracted 
and they question the usefulness of aid that simply keeps people alive. They favor 
a more expansive definition of humanitarianism that recognizes the centrality of 
education in influencing and potentially transforming the inequities that often 
contribute to conflict.55 
The history of the AFSC school program in Gaza highlights the centrality of 
the “emergency imaginary” in the emergent post-world war refugee regime. 
Whereas the Palestinian refugees immediately set about establishing schools, 
UNRPR was guided by a minimalist understanding of humanitarianism as a 
temporary life-saving measure and it did not fund education. Moreover, the 
political arm of the UN actively sought to avoid providing education, fearing it 
would “unwittingly make the refugees a long-term UN responsibility.”56 AFSC 
had different motivations. Its approach to humanitarian service was grounded 
in the principles of Quakerism and a desire to work toward reconciliation and 
peace. Schooling was seen as essential to achieving this purpose.57 Due to the high 
demand for education among the refugees and its belief that education offered 
the refugees hope for the future, AFSC continued to support the schools, even 
as the UN did little to promote the refugees’ repatriation.
However, while AFSC had the operational autonomy to set up schools, it did 
not have a budget to do so. This heavily influenced how the school program 
was set up. It was supported through ad hoc donations and in-kind resources, 
which limited expansion of the school program and resulted in its punctuated 
development. The viability of the school program was contingent on adopting 
practices that kept costs to a minimum—for example, by using the Egyptian 
53  Burde, Schools for Conflict, 40.
54  Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
55  Burde, Schools for Conflict, 40.
56  Correspondence from John Reedman to Martin Hill, Executive Office of the Secretary General, October 
28, 1949, File S-0369-0034-002 (New York: UNARMS). In the letter, Reedman notes the reluctance of the 
ESM team to recommend education as a potential activity for UNRWA and the need to convey this tactfully 
to the Specialized Agencies (most likely a reference to UNESCO). 
57  Gallagher, Quakers in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 55.
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curriculum examination structure and volunteer teachers.58 These practices were 
not sustainable, and their use created tensions between the AFSC administration 
and the refugee community. In October 1949, for instance, teachers in three 
camps in Gaza resigned over lack of pay, and they only returned to work when 
AFSC, with some difficulty, secured financial contributions that enabled them 
to pay the teachers a modest stipend.59 
Nevertheless, the early initiative taken by the refugees and AFSC’s continued 
reliance on the refugee community to run the schools likely facilitated their 
transition to UN administration. UNRWA was unprepared to begin operations 
in May 1950, although it had already delayed its start date by a month. It still 
needed to negotiate its terms of operations with governments that were clearly 
hostile to its mission, and it was under pressure to calm an increasingly tense 
political situation as the refugees grew frustrated that their return to Palestine 
was not materializing. By contrast, the schools were operated, were staffed, and, 
crucially, were supported by the refugees. It seems likely that this favored their 
continuation, even though the original plans for UNRWA did not provide for 
this level and type of education. 
The transition of the schools to UN administration did not signal an end to 
the financial challenges facing UNRWA or its burgeoning education program. 
Although UNRWA had a budget for education, it inherited UNRPR’s debt and 
was accorded only a temporary mandate and voluntary funding structure. These 
structural impediments, which were inextricably linked to the temporary and 
instrumental purpose Western donors ascribed to the agency, contribute to the 
agency’s chronic underfunding to this day. Addressing the UN General Assembly 
in October 1950, UNRWA’s first director, Howard Kennedy, warned:
I wish to emphasize the difficulties and frustrations of 
attempting to operate a multi-million-dollar enterprise without 
working capital. The Agency has rarely had in hand finance for 
more than a few weeks ahead, and at times the cash available has 
only been adequate for a matter of days. Unless there is no other 
solution feasible, I strongly urge that Agencies such as UNRWA 
be not required to operate on voluntary donations provided 
58  Prior to 1948, Gaza schools taught a Palestinian curriculum that was heavily circumscribed by British 
Mandate authorities. After 1948, the supply of books dwindled and it became impossible to accredit exams 
based on the Palestinian curriculum. The AFSC did explore creating its own curriculum but ultimately decided 
to align refugee schools with the Egyptian system, in spite of resistance from the refugee community.
59  Report on Education Activities, August 1-October 15, 1949, Folder 60, Foreign Service Section, Palestine, 
1949, Refugee Projects (Philadelphia: AFSC), 28.
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in unknown amounts at unknown times and sometimes in 
commodities that are difficult to fit into the program.60
Kennedy’s concerns were never addressed, and UNRWA’s financial situation 
has remained precarious for the last seven decades, as voluntary donations have 
often failed to keep pace with the refugee community’s population growth.61 
Lacking a systematic and sustainable solution to its financial situation, the agency 
has responded to successive financial crises by reallocating, realigning, and 
reprioritizing the money it does have. Early on, it switched funding for education 
from its relief budget to the more expansive rehabilitation budget.62 However, this 
budget is still based on voluntary contributions that are subject to renewal every 
few years. To save money for primary education during the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s, UNRWA shut down vocational education centers and discontinued adult 
education and secondary education, as well as its practice of subsidizing host 
states to accept refugees in their schools. In the 1980s, general food rations were 
also eliminated to save the education program. The agency relies increasingly on 
extra-budgetary funding to maintain its services, but funding of this sort tends 
to “focus on short-term results, which also come with increased donor control 
and alignment to their strategic objectives, [which] may not support the purpose 
global public goods are supposed to serve.”63 Moreover, UNRWA’s adaptation to 
its unreliable and unpredictable funding structure has contributed to what Al 
Husseini refers to as the agency’s “incremental and distorted administrative and 
institutional development.”64 The result is a bare-bones education program where 
few savings can be made. This financial precarity has left UNRWA vulnerable to 
the competing political stratagems of its stakeholders, as I discuss next. 
60  Remarks on Report of UNRWA by Howard Kennedy, 1950, File S-0369-034-04 (New York: UNARMS). 
Moreover, although it was prepared to offer technical support, UNESCO was “very cautious about giving 
UNRWA any money of its own.” Memo from Malcolm Adiseshiah, Head of Technical Assistance Service to 
UNESCO Director General re. Notes on Mr. Kennedy of UNRWA, TA Memo 1.227, October 10, 1950, File, 
X 07.21(5-011) TA/UNRWA (Paris: UNESCO). 
61  In August 2017, the UN secretary-general proposed making UNRWA’s budget more “sustainable, 
sufficient and predictable.” However, Danny Danon, the Israeli vice president of the General Assembly, 
dropped this item from the agenda of the General Assembly. See UN General Assembly, Resolution A/71/849, 
“Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East Report 
of the Secretary-General,” March 30, 2017, cited in Jaber Suleiman, “The Ongoing UNRWA Crisis: Context, 
Dimensions, Prospects and Responses,” Policy Dialogues Series, Lebanese-Palestinian Relations/06 (Beirut: 
Common Space Initiative for Shared Knowledge and Consensus Building, August 2018).
62  Report of the UNESCO Director General on the Education of Arab Refugees in the Middle East, May 
26, 1952, UNESDOC, 12.
63  Maya Rosenfeld, “From Emergency Relief Assistance to Human Development and Back: UNRWA 
and the Palestinian Refugees, 1950-2009,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 28, nos. 2-3 (2010): 286-317, https://
doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdp038; “Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibility: Financing Global Public Goods in 
Education,” UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report, March 2018, Policy Paper 34. 
64  Jalal Al Husseini, “An Agency for the Palestinians?” in Land of Blue Helmets: The United Nations and 
the Arab World, eds. Karim Makdisi and Vijay Prashad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016), 304. 
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Political Dilemmas
Whereas a core principle of humanitarianism is its apolitical nature, the essence 
of mass education is to create conditions of political belonging. Thus, attempts to 
initiate education under conditions of humanitarianism are fraught with tension. 
This is especially true in contexts where large numbers of refugees are hosted, as 
multiple stakeholders share responsibility for refugees’ education, which greatly 
complicates decision-making. The history of the AFSC program and the transition 
of the schools to UNRWA administration brings to the fore the political contests 
that undergird refugee education efforts. Former AFSC volunteer Lee Dinsmore 
recalled how the refugees and Egyptian authorities jostled for influence over the 
school program, in particular which textbooks were used. “One of the problems 
with education,” he astutely reflected, “was whose education is it going to be?”65 
From the outset, refugee politics played a key role in shaping the school program. 
As Irfan argues, demand for education among the refugees was driven by implicit 
and explicit political concerns.66 Implicitly, education was a means of empowerment. 
Explicitly, it was a tool to facilitate a return to Palestine. By 1949, teachers had gone 
on strike to demand pay and better resourcing for education, and this was just 
the beginning of decades of political activism in which UNRWA teachers played a 
key role. In 1957, for example, UNRWA teacher and renowned Gazan poet Mu’in 
Bseiso was fired by UNRWA’s Gaza office after writing a poem protesting the alleged 
collusion between the king of Jordan and the Israeli government. In coded cables, 
the UNRWA management noted that the poem not only was being played on the 
radio but was accompanied by recordings of demonstrations in schools and protest 
messages from teachers and pupils in Gaza.67 Subsequent teacher activism during the 
Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and the First Intifada (1987-1993) further underscores 
the ongoing political purpose education serves for the refugee community. 
Western donors also viewed the schools with a political calculus. By 1949, the U.S. 
and British governments were largely aligned with Israeli interests in supporting 
resettlement of the refugees outside of Palestine. This ignored the wishes of the 
host states and the refugees who sought repatriation. These differences of opinion 
were reflected in the initial plans for UNRWA, which was ambiguously tasked 
65  Lee Dinsmore, “Oral History Interview #610,” interview by Joan Lowe, AFSC, September 20, 1992, https://
www.afsc.org/sites/default/files/documents/AFSC%20Oral%20Histories%20600%20Series%20Palestine%20
Relief.pdf.
66  Irfan, “Educating Palestinian Refugees.” 
67  J. Lalive, Incoming code cable Beico 122, November 15, 1957, File, S-0169-0011-01 (New York: UNARMS); 
Henry Labouisse, Outgoing code cable number 429 from New York to Lalive in Beirut, November 16, 1957, 
Folder S-0169-0010-07 (New York: UNARMS).
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with addressing the refugees’ “economic dislocation” and supporting their 
“reintegration” in the region.68 The refugees’ resistance to resettlement outside of 
Palestine also created security concerns for donor governments. In 1949, UNRPR 
staff reported that the prevailing situation in Gaza was “ideal for the works of 
agitators who preach the gospel of unrest.”69 Then, in October 1950, UNRWA 
director Howard Kennedy warned the UN General Assembly that, “after more 
than two years of enforced idleness living under uncertain and trying conditions, 
more than 800,000 of these refugees constitute a serious threat to the peace 
and stability of the Near East countries.”70 The U.S. government, at the time 
in the throes of McCarthyism, was receptive to these concerns. In 1950, a U.S. 
State Department report noted that the potential for communist activity and 
unrest among the refugees meant that it was in the best interests of the United 
States “to alleviate the refugee problem, and to improve the lot of these people.”71 
Humanitarian motivations and security considerations thus went hand in hand 
to influence U.S. support for UNRWA. 
Egyptian authorities also viewed the refugees as a destabilizing force and a threat 
to their legitimacy.72 Consequently, they kept a close eye on the teachers and 
sought to retain a heavy influence over what happened in the schools. AFSC 
staff members expressed concern about the Egyptian authorities’ tendency to 
disseminate propaganda through the schools. Security considerations continued 
to motivate Egypt’s support for the schools after the program transitioned to 
UNRWA. In a letter from the UNRWA director of education to his counterpart 
at UNESCO in 1958, the former complained that “the Egyptian authorities still 
demand for security reasons that every child has to be accepted in our secondary 
schools, thereby occupying classrooms originally built for elementary schools.”73 
As this last example suggests, these opposing purposes shaped the structure 
and policies of UNRWA’s emerging education program. Initially, UNRWA 
68  U.S. Department of State, November 1949, United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle 
East, First interim report, Folder 123, Foreign Service Section, Palestine 1949, Refugee Projects: Reports UN 
Economic Survey Mission (Clapp Mission) (Philadelphia: AFSC).
69  Memo by Dillon Meyer to Martin Hill, November 9, 1949, File, S-0369-034-04 (New York: UNARMS).
70  “Interim Report of the Director,” A/1451/Rev.1, October 6, 1950, https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/
unispal.nsf/0/EC8DE7912121FCE5052565B1006B5152. 
71  The Palestine Refugee Program, Publication 3757, Near and Middle Eastern Series 3, U.S. Department 
of State, February 1950, Folder 248, Foreign Service Reports General (Philadelphia: AFSC), 4. 
72  See, for example, Open letter protesting the Egyptian military occupation of Gaza, sent to Captain 
Waheed Bey, the Egyptian military official in charge of refugee affairs in Gaza, Folder 8, Foreign Service 
Section, Government, Egypt (Philadelphia: AFSC). The letter signed off: “Refugees and non-refugees! Fight 
for the establishment of an Arab State and tell the occupying tyrants ‘Evacuate our country and let us live 
free!’ Down with the Anglo-American imperialism and all those who assist it!” 
73  Letter from R. Van Diffelen to W. Van Vliet, April 3, 1958, Box 37.362.92, File (5.011) UNRWA “66” 
part 3 (Paris: UNESCO).
KELCEY
Journal on Education in Emergencies 31December 2019
and UNESCO formalized many of the practices and policies AFSC and other 
voluntary agencies had adopted. Perhaps the most significant decision was to teach 
the refugees the host state curriculum.74 Inspection of the schools, which in Gaza 
had been entrusted to local education authorities, also became a core function 
of the UNRWA education program, although the agency often collaborated with 
the host state security apparatus when teachers were suspected of involvement 
in political activities. 
The practice of hiring teachers from the refugee population was also continued 
in order to meet the high demand for education. In accordance with AFSC and 
UNESCO recommendations, teachers’ salaries were increased and teacher training 
introduced, decisions that helped cement the autarkic nature of the education 
program. Western donors, however, continued to pursue the refugees’ resettlement 
in host states, including through the education program. In 1960, for example, 
UNRWA director John Davis sought to expand the education program in order to 
achieve the full enrollment of eligible refugees. U.S. officials tacitly agreed to the 
expansion but reminded Davis that “UNRWA must be operated so as to stimulate 
the resettlement of the refugees in every way possible.”75 Practically speaking, 
this required ongoing alignment with host state education systems to “facilitate 
the eventual phasing in of the Agency’s programme with its counterpart in each 
country once a solution to the refugee problem has been finalized.”76 
From the outset, therefore, education for the refugees was imbued with political 
meaning and purpose. This likely supported the continuation of the schools and 
UNRWA’s unplanned reorientation toward education, despite the fact that the 
ESM and UN officials overlooked the need for it. However, the refugees, Western 
donors, and host states ascribed different and at times opposing purposes to the 
schools. The contested foundations of the education program underscore the 
inevitable and unavoidably political dimensions of aid, especially in contexts of 
protracted humanitarianism, of which the Palestinian case is exemplary. Of note: 
Feldman writes of the politics of humanitarianism, which shape subjects, societies, 
and systems, and the politics in humanitarianism, by which people living within 
74  See, for example, UNESCO, “Report of the Director General on the Education of Arab Refugees in the 
Middle East,” 12. This policy was qualified, however, with the recommendation that the refugees be taught 
Palestinian history and geography. 
75  Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 5, 1960, Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1958-1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume Xiii, Office 
of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, cited in Jalal Al Husseini, “An Agency for the Palestinians?” 306.
76  Bi-annual report, education and training division, August 1-December 31, 1960, UNESDOC, http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/001785/178573eb.pdf.
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humanitarian systems seek to affect their circumstances.77 Both phenomena have 
shaped and been shaped by education efforts for Palestine refugees, which provides 
further evidence that politics are not only unavoidable in humanitarian aid efforts 
but that humanitarianism is instrumentalized in the pursuit of political goals. The 
schools were established and developed around contested visions of the refugees’ 
future that by and large persist to this day. This reflects both the tenacity of the 
humanitarian paradigm in contexts of protracted displacement and highlights the 
limitations that humanitarianism imposes on education’s potential to promote 
meaningful social and political transformation for refugee populations. 
CONCLUSION
In considering the questions that guide this study—Why did AFSC establish a 
school program for Palestinians in Gaza? How did the AFSC school program 
operate?—it’s clear that AFSC viewed the schools as a way to counter the 
limitations of humanitarianism, as conventionally understood. Contrary to 
UNRPR’s vision of humanitarianism as encompassing only food, shelter, and 
medical aid and reflecting its longstanding commitment to local-level peace-
building and reconciliation efforts, AFSC viewed the systematization of education 
as a necessary step to ensure a just and durable resolution to the refugees’ situation. 
However, as AFSC volunteer Cassius Fenton complained, operating conditions 
in Gaza profoundly challenged these goals:
Our inability to show success toward an ultimate goal has 
enabled us with little hesitation to turn back our work to the 
UN. We had found that contrary to our early high hopes for 
achieving “friendly services”, very little was possible within the 
framework with which we had to operate. In fact, even now, the 
staff has little to suggest in the way of concrete proposals for 
furthering “Friends” concerns in that territory.78 
Despite these setbacks, and notwithstanding the refugees’ ongoing efforts to set 
up their own schools, AFSC’s systematization of the schools and their lobbying for 
the continued provision of education appear to have played an important role in 
ensuring that education was an integral part of UNRWA operations. But the AFSC 
vision could not overcome the discursive limitations of humanitarianism. The 
77  Ilana Feldman, Life Lived in Relief: Humanitarian Predicaments and Palestinian Refugee Politics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018).
78  A Palestine Report by Cassius Fenton, June 7, 1950, Folder 247, Foreign Service Reports, Evaluative, 
1950 (Philadelphia: AFSC).
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temporary and teleological view of humanitarian crises evoked by the “emergency 
imaginary” excluded education from the UNRPR budget and shaped the practices 
and policies of the AFSC school program. Two lessons from this history stand out.
First is the relevance of UNRWA’s past to understanding its present. The 
history presented in this article shows how the decisions made in the weeks 
and months immediately following a refugee crisis can have an influence on 
education programs for decades to come. The conditions under which the first 
refugee schools in Gaza were started shaped education policies and practices and 
informed the structure of the UNRWA education program. Of particular note 
are the schools’ alignment with the host state education systems, the retention 
of a separate UN administration for the schools, and the autarkic nature of the 
education program. These features have persisted, largely owing to the tenacity of 
the humanitarian paradigm in shaping responses to protracted displacement. Over 
the last 70 years, the UNRWA education program has been invoked under the 
labels of humanitarian relief, rehabilitation, welfare, protection, and development 
programming. However, the relentless need to fundraise and persistent critiques 
that the schools are politicized underscore the implicit humanitarian logic 
attached to the agency and its schools. This provides an alternative perspective 
on the U.S. government’s recent defunding of the agency. In announcing its 
decision, the state department stated that “Palestinians, wherever they live, deserve 
better than an endlessly crisis-driven service provision model. They deserve to 
be able to plan for the future.”79 This is a valid critique. History shows that the 
agency’s financial volatility has resulted in ad hoc programming and an inability 
to align the schools with a just and durable vision for the refugees’ future. The 
precarious balance of opposing stakeholder interests also heightened the education 
program’s susceptibility to being manipulated for politically expedient objectives. 
But the continued existence of UNRWA and the intergenerational dependency 
on its services by millions of Palestinians in no small part reflect the inherently 
political context in which the agency is embedded. U.S. policies have persistently 
characterized the refugees as a temporary economic problem, continue to objectify 
them as a security threat, and seek to resettle them against their will. 
The second and related lesson, therefore, is the importance of learning from 
the Palestinian case when designing and implementing education responses to 
large-scale displacement crises. Many of the features that currently distinguish 
the UNRWA education program from the UNHCR approach—features that have 
tended to exclude or make an exception of the Palestinian case and obviate the 
79  U.S. Department of State, “On U.S. Assistance to UNRWA,” https://www.state.gov/on-u-s-assistance-
to-unrwa/.
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lessons it offers for contemporary academic and policy debates—in fact reflect 
the limitations that come with initiating education efforts for refugees within 
the humanitarian paradigm, in particular the vision of a crisis as a temporary 
state and the assumption that political interests can be bypassed. The Palestinian 
case has been exceptionally protracted and is compounded by Palestinians’ 
statelessness. However, most displacement situations now last for decades and 
durable solutions are often elusive. Moreover, responsibility for refugees is 
increasingly shared among an array of actors.80 The history of the Palestinian 
case therefore exemplifies a growing trend in refugee situations and highlights the 
implications of humanitarian logic over education policy and practice for refugees. 
Indeed, aligning education with the principles of humanitarianism is fraught with 
contradictions. Education is necessarily oriented to the future, requires stable 
financing, and is never politically neutral. Attempts to justify education within 
the context of humanitarianism mask these realities and, as this historical account 
suggests, can create and entrench political dynamics of their own. Although 
the politics of and within humanitarianism are well established in scholarship, 
education policies and interventions for refugees continue to operate within 
the bounds of a humanitarianism that posits that politics can be practically 
and analytically isolated from programs and policies.81 One of the most recent 
iterations of this assumption is the ongoing discussion about the need to bridge the 
humanitarian-development divide. Implicit in these discussions is the assumption 
of a linear and teleological transition away from a temporary state of emergency. 
But, as the protracted Palestinian case highlights, education initiatives for refugees 
need to be conceived of free from the limitations of the humanitarian paradigm 
and in ways that are flexible enough to support at least the full gamut of durable 
solutions: voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and local integration. These 
solutions are neither mutually exclusive nor spatially and temporally consistent. 
Rather, they behoove a more flexible ideology that allows education programs to 
respond to the myriad transnational, national, and local challenges that refugees 
face and, as AFSC originally intended, refugees’ ongoing need for justice. 
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